Bird & Bird has published an article reminding one that the export of certain categories of software, and particularly encryption software, is controlled by export control regulations in the UK and the EU.  After the UK’s withdrawal from the EU exporters of software (including where software is embedded in physical products) will have to consider the added dimension of export and import of controlled software between the EU and UK and vice versa.  It points out that under many licensing agreements, a breach of the export regulations may also result in a breach of the terms of a software licence.  The article focuses on the regime applicable to dual-use items, which is the export control regime most likely to be relevant to the export commercial software.



The Institute for Science and International Security makes available on its website links to a number of You Tube videos that comprise an online course on the technical underpinnings of nuclear non-proliferation with a special focus on Iran, North Korea, and trafficking in nuclear commodities.  The course lectures provide an introduction to the key facets of developing the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment, plutonium production and separation, and nuclear weaponisation.  Gas centrifuges are discussed extensively since they are today the dominant method to produce enriched uranium and have been favoured by proliferant states, such as Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, among others, as part of efforts to seek nuclear weapons or at least a nuclear weapons capability.  The course is useful for practitioners in government, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations alike.